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Following Narendra Modi’s maiden visit to China in May 2015, the Joint 
Statement that was released by India and China, affirmed that: “an early 
settlement of the boundary question serves the basic interests of the two 
countries and should be pursued as a strategic objective by the two 
governments”. Nonetheless, this joint determination to seek a political 
settlement to the protracted border issue is tainted by great pessimism 
and speculations. Despite a strong political will on each side, and 
incentives, such as various agreements and confidence building 
measures, the ‘boundary problem’ remains unresolved and rather more 
complicated. Neville Maxwell rightly notes: “the border dispute between 
India and China stands exactly where it did when it first emerged half a 
century ago”.  
The increased military standoffs between Indian and Chinese troops at 
the disputed border further delay the political settlement, and add fuel to 
the stagnancy. Given this, what is noteworthy is that although on the 
surface, the India-China border remains peaceful,  it still serves as a 
delicate flashpoint in the bilateral relationship. There remains a 
compounded risk of escalation as a result of miscalculations born out of 
‘trust deficit’. 
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The territorial dispute between India and China exists in two areas of the Himalayan frontier: in the 
Eastern Sector, in Arunachal Pradesh (around 83,740 square kilometres) and in the Western Sector, 
in Aksai Chin (around 37,250 square kilometres). Arunachal Pradesh is administered by India as a 
state while Aksai Chin is administered by China as part of Xinjiang. The problem lies in the Line of 
Actual Control (LAC), which is a 4,056-kilometre long boundary between India and China that 
remains undefined, yet to be demarcated on the ground and delineated on maps. These complexities 
have turned the ‘territorial issue’ into a perpetual dilemma between India and China, thereby, 
making the early settlement of the boundary issue almost unlikely in the near future. 
That is, despite a strong political will between India and China to resolve the ‘boundary problem’, 
the feasibility to reach such a resolution remains highly questionable. This can be explained as 
follows: 
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First, the ‘border talks’ as confidence building measures have failed to make any significant 
progress. Since 2003, after eighteen rounds of border talks between the Special Representatives of 
India and China, there has been no headway in resolving the issue. Both sides agreed to conform to 
the guidelines and norms put forward in the 2005 agreement on ‘Political Parameters and Guiding 
Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question’- which has failed to provide a 
solid base to the resolution process. By signing that agreement, India and China have crossed the 
first stage, where both have reached the agreement to settle the boundary question. The second 
stage, which has been on building the “framework for resolution of the boundary question,” has 
been evolving for the past eight years. And that only after drawing the “framework” will the two 
sides be able to proceed to the third stage of the talks that entails “demarcation on maps of any 
framework agreement and delineation on the ground”. It is clear that as the dispute has been 
ongoing since 1962, similarly, the negotiations also seem to be taking a long path to finally arrive at 
a firm resolution. That is, as the negotiations are still in an unfolding stage and not resulting in a 
constructive outcome, it has become difficult to predict a fixed deadline towards settling the 
protracted boundary question. The border talks have thus become a customary mechanism of 
conflict management rather than that of conflict resolution. 
Second, there is a brimming military instability along the border after two decades of relative peace. 
The Chinese incursions along the LAC have gradually increased in the recent past. Exemplary of 
this action is the most recent case of India’s dismantling of a Chinese built watchtower causing a 
standoff between Indian and Chinese troops in the Burtse region of northern Ladakh. This has been 
preceded by various standoffs as a result of Chinese incursions in the Depsang region in Ladakh. 
Most importantly, in 2013 a twenty-day standoff at Burthe in Daulat Beg Oldie (DOB) sector 
brought both India and China into a near-military confrontation on their unsettled border in Ladakh. 
While in September 2014, a sixteen day military face-off at the Chumar sector of Eastern Ladakh 
after a high-level flag meeting between the two parties, which strategically coincided with Chinese 
President Xi Jinping’s maiden visit to India, gave a jolt to the relations amidst ‘Modi-Xi’ diplomatic 
engagement. Therefore, these increasing episodes of military standoffs contribute to further mistrust 
and thus, significantly hinder, the boundary settlement between India and China.  
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And, lastly, both sides have increased their military build-up along the border. China has deployed 
almost 300,000 troops along the border, while India has approximately 200,000 to 220,000 troops 
stationed in the regions bordering China. On one hand, the latter has also made huge infrastructure 
build up in Tibet, and it is well equipped to move large military division along the LAC and has also 
transferred its CSS-5 missiles to Tibet. On the other hand, India has upgraded as well its military 
deployments in Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim and, Northern Ladakh to prevent any Chinese land-grab. 
It has also launched a crash program to improve its logistical capabilities through new roads, 
airstrips, and advanced landing stations along the Himalayas. India is also reported to have placed 
Su-30s into the Eastern sector, and has also moved its Agni II and Prithvi III missiles to the border 
areas. These hard balancing tactics are further destabilising the resolution process. 
Therefore, from the above assessments it can be rightly said that the India-China boundary problem 
has become an anathema in their relations, wherein a peaceful resolution of the territorial crisis 
itself has become a dilemma for India and China. Hence, there is very little space between India and 
China to take a step forward in the boundary settlement. 
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